Here is a video where the Texas Castle Law is discussed:
http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/07/01/burglary.shooting.ap/index.html?iref=newssearch#cnnSTCVideo
I know that in Texas you can use deadly force to protect your property, not just your person.
A Texas attorney said that you could, anyway.
I just don't think that extends to someone simply tresspassing on your property without damaging anything.
You should probably get some specifics from that Texas attorney, then. It is not cut and dried, at all. I just googled a bit, but there is so much information, it goes well beyond my interest in this thread.
There are many specific circumstances that must all be met for it to be "legal" to kill someone for robbery. Homes are considered at higher risk than other property and the laws are more lax when defending a home, whether it is yours or your neighbor's home.
What it all boils down to is whether or not the prosecution team is up to the challenge of pursuing a particular case. As always, politics rule the day in most of these cases.
Most people who kill another person have their cases presented to a grand jury for further review, no matter what the circumstances. Again, does the grand jury want to go with the letter of the law or the intent of the law? Do they allow a vigilante act to be perpetrated upon an alleged criminal or do they try to stop vigilantism, one citizen at a time?
The Joe Horn incident is certainly an infamous case. There are plenty, like this. There are as many cases that went the other way.
Chapter 9 of the Texas Penal Code describes deadly force as justified to prevent arson, robbery, theft or criminal mischief at night, or to prevent a suspect from fleeing if the property owner "reasonably believes the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means; or the use of force other than deadly force to protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury."
"You hear someone stealing something off your front porch. You come out there with a gun, and they're running off. It's nighttime. The law in Texas allows you to shoot them," said former Dallas County prosecutor Toby Shook.
Shannon Edmonds, director of governmental relations for the Texas District and County Attorneys Association, said he didn't know of a single Texas case in which the castle law would have made a difference.
"The reality is Texas grand juries routinely no-billed deadly force cases under the old law, which was very lenient," he said. "Many of the cases that you read about center on defense of property laws, which were always very, very lenient in the use of deadly force.
"That's just how Texas is."
OK, last post here, I promise. You can tell by the wording of this statute that the intention of the legislators was to leave some room for interpretation of events in each case. Mr Toby Shook's words represent ONE interpretation. Kind of shows you the mindset of some of the prosecutors, though, doesn't it?
Here it is ...
PENAL CODE
CHAPTER 9. JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
SUBCHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
§ 9.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:
(1) "Custody" has the meaning assigned by Section
38.01.
(2) "Escape" has the meaning assigned by Section
38.01.
(3) "Deadly force" means force that is intended or
known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended
use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.
(4) "Habitation" has the meaning assigned by Section
30.01.
(5) "Vehicle" has the meaning assigned by Section
30.01.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 293, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997.
Amended by:
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1, § 1, eff. September 1,
2007.
§ 9.02. JUSTIFICATION AS A DEFENSE. It is a defense to
prosecution that the conduct in question is justified under this
chapter.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
§ 9.03. CONFINEMENT AS JUSTIFIABLE FORCE. Confinement
is justified when force is justified by this chapter if the actor
takes reasonable measures to terminate the confinement as soon as
he knows he safely can unless the person confined has been arrested
for an offense.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
§ 9.04. THREATS AS JUSTIFIABLE FORCE. The threat of
force is justified when the use of force is justified by this
chapter. For purposes of this section, a threat to cause death or
serious bodily injury by the production of a weapon or otherwise, as
long as the actor's purpose is limited to creating an apprehension
that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute the
use of deadly force.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
§ 9.05. RECKLESS INJURY OF INNOCENT THIRD PERSON. Even
though an actor is justified under this chapter in threatening or
using force or deadly force against another, if in doing so he also
recklessly injures or kills an innocent third person, the
justification afforded by this chapter is unavailable in a
prosecution for the reckless injury or killing of the innocent
third person.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
§ 9.06. CIVIL REMEDIES UNAFFECTED. The fact that
conduct is justified under this chapter does not abolish or impair
any remedy for the conduct that is available in a civil suit.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
SUBCHAPTER B. JUSTIFICATION GENERALLY
§ 9.21. PUBLIC DUTY. (a) Except as qualified by
Subsections (b) and (c), conduct is justified if the actor
reasonably believes the conduct is required or authorized by law,
by the judgment or order of a competent court or other governmental
tribunal, or in the execution of legal process.
(b) The other sections of this chapter control when force is
used against a person to protect persons (Subchapter C), to protect
property (Subchapter D), for law enforcement (Subchapter E), or by
virtue of a special relationship (Subchapter F).
(c) The use of deadly force is not justified under this
section unless the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is
specifically required by statute or unless it occurs in the lawful
conduct of war. If deadly force is so justified, there is no duty to
retreat before using it.
(d) The justification afforded by this section is available
if the actor reasonably believes:
(1) the court or governmental tribunal has
jurisdiction or the process is lawful, even though the court or
governmental tribunal lacks jurisdiction or the process is
unlawful; or
(2) his conduct is required or authorized to assist a
public servant in the performance of his official duty, even though
the servant exceeds his lawful authority.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
§ 9.22. NECESSITY. Conduct is justified if:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is
immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm;
(2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm
clearly outweigh, according to ordinary standards of
reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law
proscribing the conduct; and
(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification
claimed for the conduct does not otherwise plainly appear.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
SUBCHAPTER C. PROTECTION OF PERSONS
§ 9.31. SELF-DEFENSE. (a) Except as provided in
Subsection (b), a person is justified in using force against
another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the
force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the
other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. The actor's belief
that the force was immediately necessary as described by this
subsection is presumed to be reasonable if the actor:
(1) knew or had reason to believe that the person
against whom the force was used:
(A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was
attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor's occupied
habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment;
(B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was
attempting to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the
actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or
(C) was committing or attempting to commit
aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual
assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery;
(2) did not provoke the person against whom the force
was used; and
(3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity,
other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or
ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used.
(b) The use of force against another is not justified:
(1) in response to verbal provocation alone;
(2) to resist an arrest or search that the actor knows
is being made by a peace officer, or by a person acting in a peace
officer's presence and at his direction, even though the arrest or
search is unlawful, unless the resistance is justified under
Subsection (c);
(3) if the actor consented to the exact force used or
attempted by the other;
(4) if the actor provoked the other's use or attempted
use of unlawful force, unless:
(A) the actor abandons the encounter, or clearly
communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing
he cannot safely abandon the encounter; and
(B) the other nevertheless continues or attempts
to use unlawful force against the actor; or
(5) if the actor sought an explanation from or
discussion with the other person concerning the actor's differences
with the other person while the actor was:
(A) carrying a weapon in violation of Section
46.02; or
(B) possessing or transporting a weapon in
violation of Section 46.05.
(c) The use of force to resist an arrest or search is
justified:
(1) if, before the actor offers any resistance, the
peace officer (or person acting at his direction) uses or attempts
to use greater force than necessary to make the arrest or search;
and
(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably
believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself
against the peace officer's (or other person's) use or attempted use
of greater force than necessary.
(d) The use of deadly force is not justified under this
subchapter except as provided in Sections 9.32, 9.33, and 9.34.
(e) A person who has a right to be present at the location
where the force is used, who has not provoked the person against
whom the force is used, and who is not engaged in criminal activity
at the time the force is used is not required to retreat before
using force as described by this section.
(f) For purposes of Subsection (a), in determining whether
an actor described by Subsection (e) reasonably believed that the
use of force was necessary, a finder of fact may not consider
whether the actor failed to retreat.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 190, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.
Amended by:
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1, § 2, eff. September 1,
2007.
§ 9.32. DEADLY FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PERSON. (a) A person
is justified in using deadly force against another:
(1) if the actor would be justified in using force
against the other under Section 9.31; and
(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably
believes the deadly force is immediately necessary:
(A) to protect the actor against the other's use
or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or
(B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of
aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual
assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery.
(b) The actor's belief under Subsection (a)(2) that the
deadly force was immediately necessary as described by that
subdivision is presumed to be reasonable if the actor:
(1) knew or had reason to believe that the person
against whom the deadly force was used:
(A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was
attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor's occupied
habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment;
(B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was
attempting to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the
actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or
(C) was committing or attempting to commit an
offense described by Subsection (a)(2)(B);
(2) did not provoke the person against whom the force
was used; and
(3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity,
other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or
ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used.
(c) A person who has a right to be present at the location
where the deadly force is used, who has not provoked the person
against whom the deadly force is used, and who is not engaged in
criminal activity at the time the deadly force is used is not
required to retreat before using deadly force as described by this
section.
(d) For purposes of Subsection (a)(2), in determining
whether an actor described by Subsection (c) reasonably believed
that the use of deadly force was necessary, a finder of fact may not
consider whether the actor failed to retreat.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 5316, ch. 977, § 5, eff.
Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept.
1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 235, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.
Amended by:
Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1, § 3, eff. September 1,
2007.
§ 9.33. DEFENSE OF THIRD PERSON. A person is justified
in using force or deadly force against another to protect a third
person if:
(1) under the circumstances as the actor reasonably
believes them to be, the actor would be justified under Section 9.31
or 9.32 in using force or deadly force to protect himself against
the unlawful force or unlawful deadly force he reasonably believes
to be threatening the third person he seeks to protect; and
(2) the actor reasonably believes that his
intervention is immediately necessary to protect the third person.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
§ 9.34. PROTECTION OF LIFE OR HEALTH. (a) A person is
justified in using force, but not deadly force, against another
when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is
immediately necessary to prevent the other from committing suicide
or inflicting serious bodily injury to himself.
(b) A person is justified in using both force and deadly
force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes
the force or deadly force is immediately necessary to preserve the
other's life in an emergency.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
SUBCHAPTER D. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY
§ 9.41. PROTECTION OF ONE'S OWN PROPERTY. (a) A person
in lawful possession of land or tangible, movable property is
justified in using force against another when and to the degree the
actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to
prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful
interference with the property.
(b) A person unlawfully dispossessed of land or tangible,
movable property by another is justified in using force against the
other when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force
is immediately necessary to reenter the land or recover the
property if the actor uses the force immediately or in fresh pursuit
after the dispossession and:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the other had no
claim of right when he dispossessed the actor; or
(2) the other accomplished the dispossession by using
force, threat, or fraud against the actor.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
§ 9.42. DEADLY FORCE TO PROTECT PROPERTY. A person is
justified in using deadly force against another to protect land or
tangible, movable property:
(1) if he would be justified in using force against the
other under Section 9.41; and
(2) when and to the degree he reasonably believes the
deadly force is immediately necessary:
(A) to prevent the other's imminent commission of
arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the
nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; or
(B) to prevent the other who is fleeing
immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated
robbery, or theft during the nighttime from escaping with the
property; and
(3) he reasonably believes that:
(A) the land or property cannot be protected or
recovered by any other means; or
(B) the use of force other than deadly force to
protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or
another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
§ 9.43. PROTECTION OF THIRD PERSON'S PROPERTY. A person
is justified in using force or deadly force against another to
protect land or tangible, movable property of a third person if,
under the circumstances as he reasonably believes them to be, the
actor would be justified under Section 9.41 or 9.42 in using force
or deadly force to protect his own land or property and:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the unlawful
interference constitutes attempted or consummated theft of or
criminal mischief to the tangible, movable property; or
(2) the actor reasonably believes that:
(A) the third person has requested his protection
of the land or property;
(B) he has a legal duty to protect the third
person's land or property; or
(C) the third person whose land or property he
uses force or deadly force to protect is the actor's spouse, parent,
or child, resides with the actor, or is under the actor's care.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
§ 9.44. USE OF DEVICE TO PROTECT PROPERTY. The
justification afforded by Sections 9.41 and 9.43 applies to the use
of a device to protect land or tangible, movable property if:
(1) the device is not designed to cause, or known by
the actor to create a substantial risk of causing, death or serious
bodily injury; and
(2) use of the device is reasonable under all the
circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be when he
installs the device.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, § 6, eff. Sept.
1, 1975. Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
SUBCHAPTER E. LAW ENFORCEMENT
§ 9.51. ARREST AND SEARCH. (a) A peace officer, or a
person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, is
justified in using force against another when and to the degree the
actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to
make or assist in making an arrest or search, or to prevent or
assist in preventing escape after arrest, if:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the arrest or search
is lawful or, if the arrest or search is made under a warrant, he
reasonably believes the warrant is valid; and
(2) before using force, the actor manifests his
purpose to arrest or search and identifies himself as a peace
officer or as one acting at a peace officer's direction, unless he
reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already known by
or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested.
(b) A person other than a peace officer (or one acting at his
direction) is justified in using force against another when and to
the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately
necessary to make or assist in making a lawful arrest, or to prevent
or assist in preventing escape after lawful arrest if, before using
force, the actor manifests his purpose to and the reason for the
arrest or reasonably believes his purpose and the reason are
already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to
be arrested.
(c) A peace officer is justified in using deadly force
against another when and to the degree the peace officer reasonably
believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make an
arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest, if the use of force would
have been justified under Subsection (a) and:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct for
which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of
deadly force; or
(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a
substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or
serious bodily injury to the actor or another if the arrest is
delayed.
(d) A person other than a peace officer acting in a peace
officer's presence and at his direction is justified in using
deadly force against another when and to the degree the person
reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to
make a lawful arrest, or to prevent escape after a lawful arrest, if
the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (b) and:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the felony or
offense against the public peace for which arrest is authorized
included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or
(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a
substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or
serious bodily injury to another if the arrest is delayed.
(e) There is no duty to retreat before using deadly force
justified by Subsection (c) or (d).
(f) Nothing in this section relating to the actor's
manifestation of purpose or identity shall be construed as
conflicting with any other law relating to the issuance, service,
and execution of an arrest or search warrant either under the laws
of this state or the United States.
(g) Deadly force may only be used under the circumstances
enumerated in Subsections (c) and (d).
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
§ 9.52. PREVENTION OF ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY. The use of
force to prevent the escape of an arrested person from custody is
justifiable when the force could have been employed to effect the
arrest under which the person is in custody, except that a guard
employed by a correctional facility or a peace officer is justified
in using any force, including deadly force, that he reasonably
believes to be immediately necessary to prevent the escape of a
person from the correctional facility.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
§ 9.53. MAINTAINING SECURITY IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY.
An officer or employee of a correctional facility is justified in
using force against a person in custody when and to the degree the
officer or employee reasonably believes the force is necessary to
maintain the security of the correctional facility, the safety or
security of other persons in custody or employed by the
correctional facility, or his own safety or security.
Added by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 512, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
SUBCHAPTER F. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS
§ 9.61. PARENT-CHILD. (a) The use of force, but not
deadly force, against a child younger than 18 years is justified:
(1) if the actor is the child's parent or stepparent or
is acting in loco parentis to the child; and
(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably
believes the force is necessary to discipline the child or to
safeguard or promote his welfare.
(b) For purposes of this section, "in loco parentis"
includes grandparent and guardian, any person acting by, through,
or under the direction of a court with jurisdiction over the child,
and anyone who has express or implied consent of the parent or
parents.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
§ 9.62. EDUCATOR-STUDENT. The use of force, but not
deadly force, against a person is justified:
(1) if the actor is entrusted with the care,
supervision, or administration of the person for a special purpose;
and
(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably
believes the force is necessary to further the special purpose or to
maintain discipline in a group.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
§ 9.63. GUARDIAN-INCOMPETENT. The use of force, but not
deadly force, against a mental incompetent is justified:
(1) if the actor is the incompetent's guardian or
someone similarly responsible for the general care and supervision
of the incompetent; and
(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably
believes the force is necessary:
(A) to safeguard and promote the incompetent's
welfare; or
(B) if the incompetent is in an institution for
his care and custody, to maintain discipline in the institution.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, § 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.
Here's the rest of it.I guess the point I want to make is that it's not the Old West any more. Having to spend eight months of your life, as in Joe Horn's case, in defense of your action (or almost two years in the case I am personally familiar with) is not the same as saying "nothing happens" if you shoot someone.
